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INTRODUCTION
The Bundeswehr Transformation Center is examining how 
M&S can effectively support Concept Development and 
Experimentation (CD&E) projects analyzing different aspects 
of stabilization operations. Human Factors and Human 
Behavior analyses have been highly relevant in this context. 
Current studies examine the use of the agent-based model 
PAX for this purpose. These studies include Humanitarian 
Assistance scenarios in response to disaster-caused refugee 
movements and Irregular Warfare scenarios modeling 
asymmetric tactics instead of force-on-force engagements. 
The analysis focuses on situations in which the forces are 
facing adversaries using improvised weapons, namely 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Scenario
The current scenario being analyzed with the model PAX 
takes place inside a refugee camp operated by the German 
military. The scenario has 60 civilian agents of the same 
ethnic group; therefore, we assume that there are no acts of 
aggression among the civilians themselves. 
Because the current focus of the analysis is to develop a 
realistic behavior for the civilians in the refugee camp looking 
to the possible outcomes such weapons would have on 
civilian populations, the scenario does not contain any 
military personnel yet, even though the camp is assumed to 
be run by the military.
At the beginning of the scenario an IED detonates among 
a group of civilians. The explosion harms several agents 
standing close to the IED, while other agents residing outside 
the area of the detonation do not suffer any injury.
The further course of the simulation is then controlled by 
the direct and indirect effects of the explosion on the civilians' 
physical as well as emotional conditions.
Figure 1 depicts the initial setup of the refugee camp 
scenario that was used as the baseline for the studies 
performed during the week of the workshop.
Questions
In preparation for the workshop, major adjustments had 
been made to integrate civilian behavior in response to an 
IED explosion into the model PAX. As a result, the team was 
able to work with the model itself during the workshop, and 
view and review the current status of the implementation 
and scenario.
Among the effects that had already been considered and 
integrated into the model were
• possible physical damage caused by the IED, 
depending on the actual size of the IED
• emergence of fear among the agents who witness the 
detonation
• emergence of fear among the agents who recognize 
the detonation's effects in wounding or killing fellow 
civilians
• emergence of curiosity among agents once their fear 
has subsided
• emergence of a motivation of helpfulness towards 
injured agents after the detonation
The primary goal during IDFW20 was to use Data 
Farming and single run analysis to evaluate and further 
develop the current IED scenario in order to more accurately 
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model realistic human behavior and comprehensible actions 
and reactions to IED explosions.
The workgroup was driven by guiding questions such as:
• What effects do IED explosions have on human 
behavior?
• Have the relevant factors and elements characterizing 
such a situation been identified and captured in the 
current modeling of the agents' behavior?
• Can an IED detonation lead to aggressive behavior 
among the civilians?  If yes, what are the reasons and 
when does aggression start to dominate the situation?
STUDIES & ANALYSES
As a first step, we investigated the effects that differently-
sized IEDs had on the surrounding agents. This effort also 
served as verification for the new implementation of IEDs in 
PAX and the effects of detonations on human agents, as we 
were able to verify that different sizes of IEDs do indeed lead 
to a respective increase or decrease in injury and death 
within the model.
Experiment 1 Setup
In the model, the damage caused by an IED explosion is 
expressed in so-called "kill levels". Every kill level defines a 
type of damage it can cause, a probability with which this 
damage is actually caused, and a diameter around the center 
of the detonation inside which the kill level can cause that 
damage. The diameters (defined in meters) of the kill levels 
determine their mean areas of effectiveness (MAEs).
In this experiment we distinguished three types of kill 
level MAEs:
• MAE_CompleteKill: Agents inside this area can be 
killed by the detonation.
• MAE_MobilityKill: Agents inside this area can be so 
heavily injured by the explosion that they are unable 
to move afterwards.
• MAE_GeneralKills: Agents inside this area can suffer 
injuries that reduce their overall health, but do not kill 
them or leave them immobilized.
For our experiments, we generated IEDs of different sizes 
by modifying their respective MAEs. Table 1 shows the ranges 
we varied for each IED size. The resulting ten different sizes of 
IEDs were consecutively numbered "IED size 1" to "IED size 
10". For simplification, variation of an IED's damaging power 
was done solely by this modification of the MAEs, while the 
kill probability inside every MAE was fixed to a value of 80% 











2 3 4 1
4 6 8 2
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Table 1: Definition of IED sizes by modification of the MAE 
diameters of the different kill levels
Figure 2 shows a visual representation of the various kill 
levels and their  MAEs for the largest IED that was used in our 
experiments.
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Figure 1: Initial setup of the scenario; the position of the IED among the civilian group is marked
Experiment 1 Analysis
In examining the results of the first Data Farming 
experiment, we found that an increase in IED size led to an 
almost linear increase in the number of dead and injured 
people, as was expected. The mean number of dead and 
injured (heavily injured or immobilized) people 
(MOE_NumVictims) varied from 3.5 to 18.3 depending on 
the IED size.
Figure 3: Correlation of IED size and MOE_NumKilled and 
MOE_NumVictims
Furthermore, we verified that inside the various MAEs 
indeed about 80% of the agents suffered the respective kill 
level, as was intended.
Based on these results the team regarded the 
implementation of IEDs in the model as correct and the effects 
caused by the detonation as plausible. Out of the 10 defined 
IED sizes, three were selected, labeled "Small IED" (IED size 
1), "Medium IED" (IED size 4) and "Large IED" (IED size 10) in 
the following experiments. For ease of analysis these three 
IED sizes were once again renamed to "IED size 1" (Small IED) 
through "IED size 3" (Large IED).
Experiment 2 Setup
Having determined the IED sizes to be used from 
experiment 1, this experiment directly targeted the questions 
formulated above. We wanted to see what effects the IED 
detonation would have on agent behavior and if the effects 
seemed plausible to the participants of the working group.
To examine these questions, we set up an NOLH design 
in which we varied the following parameters:
• Sensor Range: The distance in meters up to which an 
agent can perceive dead and injured agents in his 
proximity.
• Personality Constant "Rise Of Aggression": Determines 
an agent's tendency to act aggressively in reaction to 
perceiving dead and injured people.
• Personality Constant "Rise Of Anger": Determines an 
agent's tendency to become angry in reaction to 
perceiving dead and injured people.
• Personality Constant "Rise  Of Helpfulness": Determines 
an agent's tendency to become helpful if he encounters 
people in need of help in his proximity.
• Duration of a Rescue Action: Helpful agents help those 
in need by rescuing them and bringing them to the 
medical facilities located in the refugee camp. This 
parameter defines the mean duration of such a rescue 
action.
Table 2 shows the ranges in which the parameters were 
varied.
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Figure 2: Visual representation of kill levels and MAEs of IED size 10 ("Large IED")
Parameter Min Max
Sensor Range 10.0 70.0
Constant Rise of Aggression 0.0 1.0
Constant Rise of Anger 0.0 1.0
Constant Rise of Helpfulness 0.0 1.0
Duration of a Rescue Action 120 600
Table 2: Variation of parameters in experiment 2
The Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) we wanted to 
investigate were the following:
• MOE_Time_60_pc_Angry: The duration of time it takes 
for 60% of the civilian population to get angry (i.e. the 
percentage of agents whose action-leading motive is 
anger). If that anger level  is reached in the population, 
we assume that anger is "dominating the situation" as 
referred to in the questions posted above.
• MOE_NumRescuedCivilians: The number of civilians 
that have been rescued by the end of the scenario.
• MOE_PercentageRescuedOutOfVictims: The final 
percentage of rescued civilians in relation to the 
number of people who actually need to be rescued. 
People in need of rescue are called "victims" here, 
encompassing all heavily injured agents, i.e. 
immobilized.
• MOE_FinalAverageFear: The average fear level in the 
civilian population at the end of the simulation.
• MOE_FinalAverageAnger: The average anger level in 
the civilian population at the end of the simulation.
• MOE_NumCiviliansHelpfulness: The number of agents 
who, at the end of the simulation, are willing to help 
other agents.
Experiment 2 Analysis
Two quite unexpected observations were that the point in 
time when 60% of the population was led by their anger was 
reached very quickly, and that very few of the victims 
actually received the help they needed. The reasons were 
found to be threefold:
• The range of the parameter variation in this 
experiment was, intentionally, very wide in order to 
get a coverage of the whole parameter spectrum. This 
situation also meant that lots of rather improbable, but 
still feasible combinations of parameters were 
included in the results, such as agents getting very 
angry due to the perception of victims in their 
proximity combined with not feeling any urge to help 
these perceived victims.
• The perception of the detonation as such leads to an 
instant increase of anger in the agents. This effect in 
the model seems to be quite dominant within the 
range in which the anger personality constant 
parameter had been varied, and therefore anger takes 
over as the leading motive in many of the simulated 
scenarios instantly after the detonation.
• We assumed that when agents perceive victims, they 
also react with an increase of anger as a reaction to the 
fact that no help is provided for those in need. The 
model formula responsible for this reaction generated 
an exponential increase in anger (the longer untreated 
victims are perceived, the quicker the anger rises), 
which resulted in many of those agents standing close 
to victims becoming angry very quickly.
The combination of these three factors led to anger 
becoming the dominating factor too quickly in the scenario, 
thereby not allowing the helpfulness characteristic to ever 
dominate. As a result, few victims were rescued.
The team participants deemed this course of the scenario 
rather unrealistic. The extremely rapid increase of anger due 
to the perception of untended victims seemed especially 
improbable.
Experiment 3 Setup
As a result of the findings of experiment 2, two main 
changes were made.
First, as proposed by the workgroup, the agents' 
progression of anger due to the perception of untended 
victims is no longer an exponential increase, but rather a 
linear increase instead. This change still leads to people 
getting angry from the sight of wounded and dead people, 
but, as judged by the workgroup, in a more plausible way.
Second, the parameter ranges were adapted to preclude 
parameter combinations in which people become very angry 
but do not become helpful. Table 3 shows the adapted 
parameter ranges that were used in experiment 3.
Parameter Min Max
Sensor Range 40.0 80.0
Constant Rise of Aggression 0.0 0.6
Constant Rise of Anger 0.0 0.6
Constant Rise of Helpfulness 0.5 2.0
Duration of a Rescue Action 120 600
Table 3: Parameter ranges in experiment 3
Experiment 3 Analysis
As expected, the increase of the agents' anger was 
reduced. However, the behavior of the agents still did not 
meet the workgroup's expectations, as still only very few of 
the victims received the help they needed.
As opposed to being occupied by their  anger, the agents 
in this experiment were mainly restrained from helping due to 
the fact that fear was overwhelming their other personality 
constants. One of the main problems was that agents who 
moved to the site of the detonation due to curiosity stayed 
away too far from the point of the actual incident (curious 
agents keep their distance from the place of the detonation for 
the sake of their own security). On the other hand, the model 
formula responsible for calculating the helpfulness of an agent 
A towards a victim B heavily depends on the proximity of A 
to B. We therefore assumed that these two distance factors 
collided with each other.
Experiment 4 Setup
To investigate if our assumption was correct and if we 
could indeed get better  results by merely having the curious 
agents move in closer to the victims to allow them to develop 
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a helpfulness motivation, we extended experiment 3 with a 
follow-up experiment.
The only factor actually changed in the setup was the 
distance curious agents keep to the site of the detonation. All 
other parameters remained unchanged.
Experiment 4 Analysis
The analysis of this fourth experiment showed that the 
model produced reasonable results regarding the expected 
course of the scenario, at least in some of the cases, if we 
brought the potential helpers closer to the victims, thereby 
helping them to generate a higher motivation of helpfulness 
towards the wounded.
By changing the single parameter from experiment 3  to 
experiment 4 we eliminated the dominance of the proximity 
factor built into the model's helpfulness formula. However, it 
came to a surprise to us that this change only led to the 
expected results in some of the cases, not in all of them.
Figure 4: Percentage of rescued victims of the course of time; 
comparison of Exp 2 - 4 and IED sizes 1 - 3
Figure 4 shows the percentage of rescued victims over the 
course of the simulation time. Obviously all graphs are 
monotonously increasing over simulation time. We indeed 
did receive a significant change between experiment 3 and 
experiment 4, but only in the case of the medium-sized IED. 
In the cases of small IEDs and large IEDs, the latest changes 
did not yield any significant improvements in terms of people 
being rescued.
It has to be examined in follow-on experiments why the 
changes in the scenario yielded such good results just for one 
particular IED size. 
CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this workgroup was to evaluate and 
further develop the current IED scenario of PAX and to face 
validate the new functionalities that had been introduced 
into the model for simulating the effects of an IED 
detonation on the civilian population of a refugee camp. We 
clearly achieved this goal and were able to gainfully use the 
Data Farming methodology and its power to explore the 
parameter space for scenario evaluation and development by 
subsequently refining our scenario and adjusting the 
parameter ranges.
Before we started our work, the workgroup's 
expectations regarding the effects of an IED detonation on the 
civilian population inside such a camp were captured. It 
turned out that the effects and factors that had been identified 
as important during the development of the model matched 
the expectations of the workgroup to a high degree.
Furthermore, by commonly analyzing our experiments 
and discussing the findings, we were able to, step by step, 
modify the scenario as well as certain aspects of the model 
itself during the week. Therefore we were able to generate 
more realistic courses of action in our scenario. 
Although we made good progress during IDFW20, we 
were not able to attend to all the aspects that were mentioned 
in our discussions. But we gained valuable insights that 
enabled us to derive further studies of modeling the effects of 
IED attacks on civilian populations. We recommend futher 
investigations looking to the following:
• The distance factors contained in the model formulas 
for curiosity and especially helpfulness seem to be too 
influential. It could be considered whether the 
proximity to the victims should play any role at all in 
terms of people's motivation to help.
• At the moment there is no connection in the model 
between the elements "anger arising due to the 
perception of victims" and "helpfulness arising due to 
the perception of victims". We recognized that an 
agent who perceives a victim becomes angry over the 
fact that the victim is unattended, but does not try to 
help himself. This combination might be a  possible 
behavior in such a situation. But it should also be 
possible that although being angry, an agent helps a 
victim. We will attempt to adapt the model in order to 
represent either behavior.
• The effect that an explosion instantly increases the 
anger of people witnessing the event needs to be 
reviewed and validated by empirical findings from the 
scientific field of psychology.
• The discussions during the week furthermore 
generated some new ideas for additional civilian 
behavior as a reaction to the detonation. Among those 
were suggestions such as panic or shock reactions, 
which are not yet part of the implemented civilian 
behavior.
These aspects will be addressed in the further 
development process of the model and the refinement of the 
IED scenario.
Finally it has to be said that during the four days of 
IDFW20 we had a great team and an extremely ambitious 
and collaborative atmosphere to work in. Every member of 
the workgroup contributed to the development of the model 
and the scenario with valuable comments, suggestions and 
contributions during our fruitful discussion. Special thanks to 
all members of Team 03 – THE BEST!.  
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